The Court of Appeal Interim Guidance in PMC v A Local Health Board [2025] EWCA Civ 176 and the Future of Anonymity Orders

18/02/2026

PMC v A Local Health Board [2024] EWHC 2969 (KB) concerned a failed application for an anonymity order made by a child Claimant who had already featured in articles and news reports and issued proceedings in his name a number of months prior to the application. The High Court decision was seen by many as controversial and contrary to the established legal principles. The Court of Appeal had adjourned the appeal in order to await judgment in Abbasi v Newcastle Upon Tyne NHS Trust & Others [2025] UKSC 15 but provided helpful interim guidance on anonymity orderAs the Abbasi judgment was published in April 2025, this article considers its relevant aspects and provides some thoughts on the future of anonymity orders.

 High Court Decision

The High Court decision of Nicklin J in PMC v A Local Health Board [2024] EWHC 2969 (KB) was covered in detail by Lindsay McNeil in the Temple Garden Chambers Clinical Negligence Newsletter at pages 42-44. By way of a brief summary:

1. Nicklin J dismissed the application for an anonymity order made by a child Claimant with cerebral palsy in a clinical negligence matter because the Claimant had featured in articles and news reports previously, proceedings were issued in his name a number of months ago and had been available to view on Westlaw;
2. ii. Nicklin J held that the default position is open justice and that the names of the parties to the proceedings will be made public, unless the applicant provides clear and cogent evidence in support of granting an anonymity order. The court was unsatisfied that the Claimant had demonstrated why an anonymity order would be necessary, recognising that he lacks capacity but highlighting that the Claimant’s affairs and property were managed by a professional deputy. Anonymising the Claimant at that stage would, therefore, be pointless and a disproportionate interference with the Article 10 rights of the media;
3. iii. The court distinguished JX MX v Dartford and Gravesham NHS Trust [2015] EWCA Civ 96 because it does not assist with the issue of pre-existing publicity and because the question of jurisdiction for making an anonymity order was not considered, JX MX arising out of an approval hearing under CPR 21.10 [125];
4. iv. The court highlighted that Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd [2019] AC 161 signifies that there must be a statutory basis for granting reporting restrictions that form part of an anonymity order and that neither CPR 39.2(4) nor section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 conferred such basis for granting anonymity orders. Nicklin J further concluded that s37 Senior Courts Act 1981 is limited in scope and that the Claimant did not fall within “one of the exceptional circumstances” when this provision would apply [125];
5. v. Nicklin J made obiter comments, doubting whether JX MX complies with the principle of open justice being the default position.

This decision caused an upheaval in the world of personal injury and clinical negligence, with both practitioners and courts being uncertain whether JX MX is still applicable or how anonymity order applications should be approached. An urgent appeal was made to the Court of Appeal, who decided to adjourn on 25 February 2025 in order to await the Supreme Court decision in Abbasi v Newcastle Upon Tyne NHS Trust & Others [2025] UKSC 15 but upon the encouragement of the interveners, gave an interim judgment with guidance on how anonymity order hearing should be approached in the meantime.

This article seeks to discuss the aftermaths of the High Court decision, the interim guidance given by the Court of Appeal and the future of anonymity orders in light of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Abbasi handed down on 16 April 2025.

Post-High Court Decision

The confusion that ensued following Nicklin J’s decision was threefold.

Firstly, it was no longer clear if JX MX is still binding authority in relation to approval hearings, particularly in light of Nicklin J’s comments about JX MX’s ostensible inconsistency with the principle of open justice and apparent limited scope, being an application under CPR 21.10 [123]. Anecdotal reports from the PI Bar suggest that many first instance judges were open to distinguishing or otherwise avoiding the consequences of PMC and/or were inclined to maintain the previous approach consistent with JX MX.

Secondly, Nicklin J’s comments in relation to the jurisdiction for making anonymity orders have cast doubt on the basis for such orders, as many applicants previously relied on CPR 39.2, section 6 of the Human Rights Act and/or section 37 of the Senior Courts Act. This issue isn’t discussed in detail in the reports, and that may be because unlike Nicklin J, with his background in media law, not many first instance judges wished to go down the rabbit hole of reporting restrictions. There is report, however, in February 2025, of Her Honour Judge Wall (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) making an anonymity order on the basis of section 37 of the Senior Courts Act – given that this door was left open by Nicklin J in his judgment in PMC.

Finally, there was confusion as to whether applicants for anonymity orders should continue using the PF10 form created by PIBA and accessed by applicants on Court Serve. Nicklin J gave a twelve-paragraph-long critique of this form, starting from its ostensibly erroneous reliance on CPR 39.2(3) and section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and extending to a line-by-line analysis of the language used [148-159].

This was supplemented by a Civil Procedure News issue 1/2025 (dated 14 January 2025) published by the White Book, which said the following: “Given the errors noted in the draft order [PF10], urgent consideration of its terms and their revision by the [Civil Procedure Rules Committee] would seem to be justified. Practitioners should take care to note the guidance given in the judgment [of Nicklin J] and approach the draft order accordingly”.

Although Nicklin J suggested that applicants use examples of withholding orders and reporting restrictions contained in the Administrative Court Guide 2024 [156], the author was unable to find any instance of reliance on these templates for anonymity orders. A number of anonymity orders have been published on the HMTCS website since the PMC decision, with many continue to refer to CPR 39.2, section 6 of the Human Rights Act and/or s37 of the Senior Courts Act¹ .

The Personal Injury Bar Association intervened in the appeal in and highlighted the above uncertainties plaguing personal injury litigation during the short hearing on 25 February 2025. As a result, the Court of Appeal agreed to issue a written judgment aimed at providing interim guidance for personal injury practitioners until the Court of Appeal is in the position to give judgment on the appeal.

Court of Appeal Interim Judgment [2025] EWCA Civ 176

1. The appeal was adjourned until the next available date after the Supreme Court hands down judgment in Abbasi, as it is anticipated that this decision would be relevant to the questions of: a. Jurisdiction for making anonymity orders; and b. The nature of evidence required for the balancing exercise between open justice and Article 8 right to private and family life under In Re S [2004] UKHL 47; [2005] 1 AC 593 (“In Re S”).
2. ii. Practitioners and judges are best to continue using form PF10 for the time being; and
3.  ii. First instance judges remain bound by the decision in JX MX.

The Future of Anonymity Orders

Abbasi

The Supreme Court handed down judgment in Abbasi on 16 April 2025. This appeal concerned Reporting Restriction Orders (RROs) made in respect of the names of doctors involved in proceedings to withdraw life[1]sustaining treatment of a number of gravely ill children. These orders were previously granted by the family courts in the course of the end-of-life proceedings on account of the Trusts’ concerns that disclosing the names of clinicians would lead to those professionals receiving abuse from the public and would adversely affect the medical care provided to the children. After the children passed away, their parents had applied for these restrictions to be released so that they would be free to tell their stories to the media.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and discharged the RROs. The Court examined the jurisdiction under which the original orders could have been made and under which they can be continued and decided that because the only basis for continuing the injunctions are the rights of the clinicians, they should have been the applicants. The generic evidence before the court also failed to demonstrate a specific risk of harm caused by naming the clinicians.

Of note, the Supreme Court made the following comments on:

1. Jurisdiction for an injunction i. The Supreme Court confirmed that although section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act does provide an inherent and “theoretically unlimited equitable power” to grant injunction, this must be exercised in accordance with recognised principles and any other restrictions established by precedent and rules of court [83]. ii. Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act should only be utilised by the courts to protect compliance with a Convention right if there is no other domestic cause of action available to the applicant. “The court’s inherent equitable jurisdiction is in principle sufficiently wide to enable it to grant an injunction when its failure to do so would be incompatible with Convention rights… However, domestic causes of action are the means by which compliance with Convention rights, including those protected by article 8, is normally secured. The function of the Convention is generally to set a boundary which domestic law cannot go beyond without contravening international obligations… the European court allows a margin of appreciation to national authorities. Our domestic law is determinative of rights and obligations within that margin of appreciation.” [86-87]

Citing paragraph 132 of the judgment in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22,

“The 1998 Act does not create any new cause of action between private persons. But if there is a relevant cause of action applicable, the court as a public authority must act compatibly with both parties’ Convention rights.”

iii. The Court explained that the reasoning in In re S behind the court’s jurisdiction under section 6 of the Human Rights Act “was highly unusual” and “reflected the absence from English law, at that time, of any general cause of action for the invasion of privacy” [93].

iv. Currently, domestic law provides the Claimants three relevant causes of actions – a claim in tort based on breach of confidence (which didn’t exist when the decision in In re S was passed), parens patriae powers and the power to award injunctions under Broadmoor. A right to privacy tort was said by the Court to originate from Campbell v MGN Ltd and to be capable of providing basis for an injunction [79-80]. The Court also highlighted that the High Court also has an inherent parens patriae, performing the Crown’s residual function of “protecting those who stand in need of protection”, which activated once Trusts applied to withdraw life-sustaining treatment [38-41][95]. Finally, a Broadmoor injunction is available to a public body in order to prevent interference with its performance of its public responsibilities [67-78][96].

2) Evidence required when considering the In Re S balancing exercise

i. The Supreme Court stated that where it becomes clear to a Trust that proceedings have become necessary and there is a risk of publicity, it is acceptable for the Trust to make an application relying upon generic evidence as “the risk lies entirely in the future” and the nature of such proceedings is urgent [138-9, 148]. Any injunction issued at that point should expire either at the end of the proceedings or at the end of a cooling-off period thereafter [142].

ii. Upon the conclusion of any cooling-off period, the clinicians can in their own name apply to continue the injunction, at which point they should adduce evidence “specific to them which establishes why a relaxation of their anonymity should cause a disproportionate invasion of their rights to privacy” [146-149, 155]. The Court’s reasoning stems from European court case law, which “firmly established” “the need for any restrictions [of freedom of expression] [to] be established convincingly” [159-160]. The Supreme Court proceeded to cite a number of European cases on this point, including Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6.

iii. The Court was critical that the only evidence provided was that of harassment of hospital staff in other cases, such as the “uncontrolled furore” which followed the cases of Charlie Gard and Alfie Evans, stating that reliance on generic evidence was understandable at the outset of proceedings but “less so after a number of years had passed” [155].

Where does this take us?

Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court’s comments in Abbasi in relation to the application of section 6 of the Human Rights Act and section 37 of the Senior Courts Act support Nicklin J’s decision in PMC that neither could form jurisdictional basis for a reporting restriction. They also contravene the Court of Appeal’s obiter comments earlier this year in Tickle v BBC [2025] EWCA Civ 42 that if there was a jurisdictional basis upon which the trial judge could have made an order anonymising the names of judges involved in Sara Sharif’s care proceedings, then it would have been under section 6 of the Human Rights Act.² In light of Supreme Court’s decision in Abbasi, unless the Appellants in PMC successfully establish that there is no alternative domestic cause of action available, the Court of Appeal will likely be required to find that section 6 does not provide the jurisdictional basis for anonymity orders.

Evidence required

The Supreme Court in Abbasi was unequivocal that evidence in support of requesting a reporting restriction must relate to risks specific to the applicant, as opposed to generic risk. This is contrary to the principle arising out of JX MX that it is unnecessary for a court to “identify specific risks in order to establish a need for protection” [31]. This contradiction would need to be reconciled by the Court of Appeal by either distinguishing Abbasi on the facts or by overturning JX MX (an outcome that Nicklin J would seemingly welcome).

What is certain is that the approach to anonymity orders will be changing and I would strongly recommend that personal injury practitioners read the Court of Appeal decision in PMC once it is published.