Home / Resources / The Importance of Distinguishing Diagnosis from Treatment in the Context of Consent to Treatment: Enaholo v Totally PLC & Anor [2024]EWHC 3249 (KB)

The Importance of Distinguishing Diagnosis from Treatment in the Context of Consent to Treatment: Enaholo v Totally PLC & Anor [2024]EWHC 3249 (KB)

18/02/2026

BREACH OF DUTY & CAUSATION

The Claimant brought a claim against the Defendants for negligently misdiagnosing him with a psychiatric disorder and referring him for assessment under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) without his consent, alleging that the same had caused him to suffer injury, loss and damage, including the loss of a job that he would have otherwise obtained.

Between 2018-19, the Claimant reported various physical symptoms and made a complaint to the Metropolitan Police alleging that they had exposed him to irradiation, causing so-called ‘electrosensitivity’. He attended medical appointments, where a provisional diagnosis of psychosis was made; his medical notes reflected these concerns, albeit that no further formal steps were taken to report them. Although he was taken to hospital for further testing, he voluntarily left without undergoing an MHA assessment.

The Claimant represented himself as a litigant-in-person in the preliminary issue trial in the High Court. He alleged that it was a ‘pure diagnosis’ case to which the Bolam test did not apply, relying upon Muller v. King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2017] QB 987. He alleged that electrosensitivity is not a condition outside mainstream medical discourse and experience, but rather that it should have been recognised as a pathological condition.

Dismissing the claim, Kerr J. distinguished treatment from diagnosis, holding that the common-law should not define ‘diagnosis’ in a technical manner. Diagnoses do not require patient consent, otherwise, medical professional judgement would be hindered: “A requirement of patient consent would deprive doctors of their objective independent judgment, which is indispensable in enabling them to prescribe the appropriate treatment or recommend further testing.” [54]. He accepted that it had not been unreasonable for the medical personnel to draw the conclusion that the Claimant’s medically unrecognised beliefs were a delusion.

The Court went on to dismiss the further claims in data protection and for rectification of the Claimant’s medical records.

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