R (AFA) v (1) Secretary of State for the Home Department (2) Secretary of State for Defence

13/08/2025

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Citation

[2025] EWHC 2143 (Admin)

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Sian Reeves, led by Alan Payne KC, represented the Secretary of State for Defence (“SSD”) and the Home Secretary in this claim for judicial review concerning the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (“ARAP”). The First Claimant, AFA, had made an application under ARAP on the basis he worked as a driver for a number of companies who provided security and risk management services in Afghanistan.  His employers had worked on two projects/programmes funded by the UK Government.

AFA challenged two decisions of the SSD, both of which were based on assessments made by the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (“SSFCDA”). The first decision was to the effect that AFA was not eligible for relocation to the UK under Category 4 of ARAP.  Following a review, the second decision confirmed the first decision.  These decisions were made on the basis that AFA did not satisfy the requirement of condition 2 of Category 4 of ARAP, which provided that the person concerned, “in the course of the employment or work or the provision of those services under Condition 1, made a substantive and positive contribution towards the achievement of one or more of the following: (i) the UK Government’s military objectives with respect to Afghanistan; or (ii) the UK Government’s national security objectives with respect to Afghanistan (and for these purposes, the UK Government’s national security objectives include counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and anti-corruption objectives)”.   

The single ground of challenge was that the SSD’s decision that AFA was not eligible under Category 4 of ARAP was wrong in law or Wednesbury unreasonable.  AFA contended that: (i) the SSD failed to conduct such inquiries as were required in law by reason of the Tameside duty of enquiry; (ii) the SSD erred in his consideration of Condition 2 by failing properly to assess whether AFA’s work as a driver made a “substantive and positive contribution toward the achievement of … UK’s national security objectives“; (iii) the SSD made a material error of law in their assessment of the objectives of the two programmes on which AFA worked; and (iv) the SSD’s decisions were Wednesbury unreasonable due to a failure to take into account material factors.

The claim for judicial review was heard by Garnham J on 10 July 2025 and judgment was handed down on 13 August 2025.  The claim for judicial review was dismissed. 

Garnham J held: The UK Government’s national security objectives had not been defined in the Immigration Rules, ARAP, or any operational guidance. The court had to give the words their natural and ordinary meaning. Identifying the UK Government’s national security objectives in a particular context or country was an evaluative question for the executive, subject only to challenge on Wednesbury principles.

There was a powerful case that delivering a stable Afghanistan which could maintain its own security was a national security objective, at least in the absence of a definition excluding such matters, or evidence that such matters were not included. It could be argued that those were the objectives of the programmes on which AFA’s employers were engaged.

However, even if the SSD’s approach to what fell within national security objectives was wrong, AFA had to establish that the SSD had erred in deciding that he had not made a substantive and positive contribution towards achieving the objectives. A job title was not decisive, but given the policy’s wording, an individual’s work rather than the programme’s objectives had to have made a substantive and positive contribution.

The SSD had been right to conclude that that there was no Evidence that AFA had personally made any significant contribution to national security. His role, whilst carried out under dangerous conditions, had been routine and mundane and could have been carried out by anyone able to drive the vehicles. Taken alone, it had not had any significant, direct, or positive effect on the UK’s national security. The SSD’s conclusions had not been irrational or unreasonable.

1. There was no basis on which AFA could argue that the SSD had been in breach of the Tameside duty of enquiry. All the evidence provided by AFA had been taken into account. It was not for the court to decide what was a reasonable line of inquiry; instead it reviewed SSD’s decision as to the inquiries he should make on Wednesbury grounds. There was no proper ground of challenge on that basis.

A link to the judgment can be found here.