Robin Tam has a general common law practice which has become particularly specialised in the fields of judicial review and administrative law, especially in immigration and asylum and in the interface between public law and private law. Before taking silk in 2006, he had been on the panels of Junior Counsel to the Crown since 1994, including the A Panel.
Human rights have long been an important feature of his cases, particularly since the inception of the Human Rights Act. More recently, he has been prominently involved in litigation relating to control orders, “deportation with assurances” and the detention and deportation of foreign national offenders. These areas of work lead to him being routinely briefed to appear in the higher courts, including regular appearances in the Supreme Court. He has extensive experience of closed material procedures. His familiarity with the handling of sensitive information within litigation, and with the demands of both government departments and courts in that context, has also been deployed in other contexts, including high-profile inquests and inquiries.
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Following a three-day hearing in the Administrative Court, Lewis J found that a curfew imposed on a foreign national offender was unlawful as it was imposed pursuant to an unpublished policy about curfews, and because the Claimant was not afforded an opportunity to make representations prior to its imposition. The policy concerned the re-imposition of curfews that had had to be lifted following the Court of Appeal’s decision in R (Gedi) v Home Secretary  EWCA Civ 409,  4 WLR 93 (in which Robin Tam QC had also represented the Home Secretary).
The appellants, who all had extant leave to remain in the UK, applied in time for further leave to remain. They could have benefited from section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 extending their leave until after their applications had been decided and any time for appealing had passed. The Supreme Court considered how this section operates when the application is procedurally invalid for a reason such as the non-payment of the required fee, or the payment of an insufficient fee, or a failure to comply with a request made during consideration of the application for the applicant to enrol biometric information.
The claimants were all foreign criminals whose deportation was generally required by section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. The Court of Appeal considered the way in which the Immigration Rules in force before 28 July 2014 should be applied, and also the Immigration Rules in force from that date taken together with the new Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (inserted by the Immigration Act 2014).
The appellant claimed that she had been unlawfully detained pending her deportation. A new medical report advancing a new diagnosis of her condition was submitted to the Home Secretary but was not properly dealt with. However, on judicial review she would at most receive only nominal damages. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that in those circumstances, it was right to refuse her permission to apply for judicial review.
The Home Secretary wished to deport the appellant following the end of his criminal sentence. In the interim, she imposed restrictions on him under paragraph 2(5) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971, including a curfew. Did that power allow the Home Secretary to impose a curfew?
The appellant had been granted bail during deportation proceedings, which had become so protracted (because of his own refusal to identify himself) that it would no longer have been lawful to detain him because of the limitation imposed by the case of Hardial Singh. Did this mean that there was no longer any power to grant bail?
Inquiry into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, who died from Polonium poisoning in 2006.
The Home Secretary deprived the appellant of his British citizenship, but the Vietnamese government – not acting in accordance with Vietnamese law – declined to accept that he was a Vietnamese national. Did this mean that he had been made stateless by the deprivation?
The Appellant was detained for deportation after a criminal court recommended that he be deported. Subsequent administrative detention reviews were legally flawed.
The Home Secretary signed a deportation order against the appellant, invalidating his previous leave to remain in the United Kingdom. He won his statutory appeal, and the Home Secretary later revoked the deportation order. Did that mean that his previous leave to remain automatically revived?
The claimant was stopped at Heathrow Airport under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and was allowed to telephone his solicitor. But the police officers would not wait for his solicitor to arrive at the airport before beginning to question him. It would be a criminal offence for him to refuse to answer those questions. Did the officers have the power to question him after the presence of the solicitor had been requested and before his arrival?
The appellant claimed to be a child, but a local authority assessed him to be an adult. The Home Secretary acted on the basis of that assessment and detained him for removal. Later, a different local authority assessed him to be a child. Had the Home Secretary’s duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 regarding the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children been breached when he was detained, so as to make his detention unlawful?
A financial sanctions measure against the appellant bank was examined by the High Court using procedures including a closed material procedure. When the appeal from that decision reached the Supreme Court, did the Supreme Court have the power to sit in closed session to examine the closed judgment and closed evidence?
The appellant was being deported on national security grounds, but (in defiance of an order of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission) had persistently refused to disclose his true identity, thwarting the Commission’s ability to properly determine his appeal. He was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, which was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal. Was the Court of Appeal’s approach to that appeal erroneous?
The appellant was being deported on national security grounds but was granted bail subject to a curfew. The national security case against him had not been disclosed to him, even by way of a gist. Was he entitled to such disclosure under Article 6 of the ECHR?
The appellant was being deported on national security grounds, but his appeal was dismissed by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Should SIAC have excluded any evidence which may have resulted from the alleged attendance by Security Service officers at secret detention facilities abroad?
Home Secretary v CB  EWCA Civ 418,  1 WLR 3259
The Home Secretary made control orders against two Pakistani nationals. One voluntarily returned to Pakistan and the other was extradited to the United States. The control orders ceased to have practical effect and the High Court accordingly stayed the control order proceedings. Was the court entitled to do that when neither individual had exercised their right under the statute to request the discontinuance of the proceedings?
The appellants had either been excluded or were being deported from the United Kingdom. They appealed to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which adopted a closed material procedure in hearing their cases. Did the procedure breach their rights under Article 8 of the ECHR?
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