Anthony Johnson

Anthony specialises in high value matters, acting predominantly for Claimants; he is happy to act on a CFA in appropriate cases. He has significant experience of brokering six- and seven-figure settlements at levels that were highly favourable to the clients in question.

He regularly acts in cases involving complex medical evidence, including chronic pain, brain injury and asbestos exposure claims, and factual complexity (e.g. cases involving surveillance evidence and allegations of fundamental dishonesty). He is especially sought after in cases involving liability disputes, and has particular expertise in Fatal Accidents Act claims.

His role as General Editor of Binghams means that he can be relied upon to be at the forefront of all recent developments in law and practice in this field.

He has extensive experience of appellate litigation, including appearing in the Court of Appeal in Seabrook v. Adam [2021] and in Lawrence v. Kent CC [2012].

Featured Personal Injury cases

X v. Titus Newsome Ltd. & ors

Anthony successfully established liability at a three-day preliminary issue trial in a novel situation in a case where his client had suffered serious injuries when she drove into collision with the side of an abnormally large load that was travelling in the opposite direction to her, encroaching into her carriageway, when she was driving at night on a poorly-lit A-road. In a situation where there was no statutory guidance or existing authority dealing with the liability of escort vehicles, the Judge held that the duty of care on the escort company was to ensure safe road use by notifying other road users that their carriageway was encroached upon by the unexpected obstacle of the wide load. The Defendant had breached that duty of care to take adequate steps to ensure that road users travelling in the opposite direction were aware that its escort vans were accompanying an abnormal load, as opposed to merely being highway maintenance vehicles or breakdown assistance vehicles.

M v. B

Anthony represented the Claimant, a 42-year-old motorcyclist who had suffered a spinal cord injury with an ASIA impairment scale score A with a sensory level of C7. He was confined to a (powered) wheelchair that he was able to operate independently. The parties reached a negotiated settlement pre-issue in the sum of £3.45M. There were two significant complicating features in relation to the settlement that was achieved. Firstly, both primary liability and contributory negligence were strongly disputed. The parties negotiated on the basis of a global lump sum settlement, which had to be adjusted to factor in the litigation risk posed by the respective arguments on liability. Secondly, settlement was reached at a very early juncture in the litigation when the evidence that was available to advise upon settlement was fairly limited. It was necessary for the Claimant’s representatives to make projections about the likely progression of his claim in relation to, inter alia, medico-legal evidence, future medical treatment, future care requirements, accommodation, aids and equipment etc.

Rix v. (1)Stonegate Pub Company (2) Regency Security Services

Anthony established liability at trial against both Defendants in a situation where the Claimant had been seriously injured in an incident that occurred in the First Defendant’s nightclub when her friend was pushed by the Second Defendant’s security staff who were traversing the floor of the venue in order to break up a violent altercation, coming into contact with the Claimant and causing her to slip and fall over. HHJ Duddridge held that the Claimant had made out a prima facie case (pursuant to Ward v. Tesco Stores and Dawkins v. Carnival Plc.) that the First Defendant had breached its duty to her, i.e. that the floor was dangerously slippery and wet. The First Defendant had then failed to discharge its reversed evidential burden of showing that the accident happened without negligence on its part, or was at least as likely to happen despite the implementation of a proper system for avoiding such accidents. It was accepted that the liability of the Second Defendant was a novel situation that had to be decided by recourse to first principles. It was held that, whilst it is not reasonable to expect security staff to make finely calibrated judgments about their actions when responding to an emergency, they nevertheless have a duty to take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to avoid injury to others. Liability was apportioned between the Defendants in the ratio 50:50.

Seabrook v Adam [2021] EWCA Civ 382

Anthony acted for the successful Respondent in the Court of Appeal in this case which sought to explore the correct interpretation and the validity of a Claimant’s Part 36 offer for the purposes of determining whether the costs consequences set out in CPR 36.17 should apply. Their Lordships agreed with both judges below that the Claimant had not beaten two 90:10 split liability offers in a situation where primary liability/breach of duty had been admitted but where the Defendant’s insurers sought to dispute the causation of the Claimant’s alleged injuries, successfully establishing at trial that the most serious of the two injuries that he had allegedly sustained could not be causally linked to the index accident.

Lawrence v Kent CC [2012] EWCA Civ 493

Anthony acted for the Claimant/Appellant in the Court of Appeal in this case in which their Lordships gave guidance upon the approach the appellate courts should take to appeals on questions of contested fact that have been determined by the trial judge, as opposed to matters of discretion. The case started life as a minor Fast-Track claim brought pursuant to the Highways Act 1980.

Bourne Leisure v Shakespeare [2012] QBD

Anthony acted for the successful Respondent who had been involved in a slipping accident at the Defendant’s holiday resort. Butterfield J. upheld the trial judge’s imposition of liability on the basis that the Defendant’s inspection regime was insufficient and that it could have taken some minor steps to change its policies without ruining the atmosphere in its nightclub venue. He rejected the Appellant’s case that the trial judge had imposed too high a duty on the Defendant that amounted a counsel of perfection and that, in any event, improvements in the Defendant’s system would have made no real difference in practice.

Broad v LB of Bromley [2021] Central London CC

Anthony represented the Defendant in its successful dismissal of its appeal against a case management decision not to allow him to rely upon expert evidence from a Highways Engineer in relation to the correct categorisation of a highway for the purposes of the National Code of Practice for Well Maintained Highways. HHJ Baucher accepted that such evidence was not reasonably required pursuant to CPR 35.1 on the basis that categorisation was properly a question of fact for the trial judge.

Jones v TUI [2020] Portsmouth CC

Anthony represented the Claimant in his successful dismissal of the Defendant’s appeal against a determination that a General Surgeon’s evidence in relation to causation in a travel sickness claim was not inadmissible in spite of the Defendant’s criticism of its contents. HHJ Barkley accepted Anthony’s fundamental contention that issues of the type that had been raised by the Defendant went to the weight that could be attached to the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Any issues with the expert’s evidence could properly be dealt with at trial in the ordinary fashion.

Hodgson v Kinley [2013] Preston CC

Anthony acted for the successful Claimant in appeal against a trial judge’s decision to dismiss her claim, notwithstanding that it had been found that she had suffered some injury, albeit that the medical evidence did not distinguish that injury from injuries she had suffered in a previous accident. HHJ Butler accepted that this approach was illogical and contrary to law, and that the judge should have made a ‘rough and ready’ assessment based upon whatever limited evidence was available: it being difficult to quantify damages is not the same as it being impossible.